Susan Colbourn (Duke University) Gives Brown Bag Lecture on Euromissiles, NATO, and the Cold War

by Kelsi Quick, PhD Student in Political Science and a Research Assistant at the European Union Center

Why did the Euromissiles matter? In a brown bag lecture for the European Union Center on September 19, Susan Colbourn answers this question by drawing on new archival documents, public media from the Cold War era, and documents from anti-nuclear campaigns. Colbourn’s book Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons that Nearly Destroyed NATO tells the story as a transatlantic history of NATO and the Cold War. Alliance leaders, while concerned about their own countries’ security, nevertheless clearly took public opinion into account in their decision-making.

Colbourn, an associate research professor and associate director of the Program in American Grand Strategy at Duke University, makes more accessible the context behind the Euromissiles and their implications for the time. A central theme Colbourn explores is European anxiety regarding the feasibility of America’s “extended deterrence.” The uncertainty over whether America’s deterrence was enough to safeguard Europe ultimately led to the 1979 decision by NATO to deploy Euromissiles in Europe to counter Soviet usage of SS-20s. Colbourn follows the Carter Administration’s “Dual Track” decision, which aimed to secure reductions in Soviet arms. She details how Germany was resistant towards being the only country hosting Euromissiles, which ultimately led to Italy’s decision to join as a host country of the weapons as well. These deployments, Colbourn explains, were carried out despite mass protests in Europe and the U.S. Eventually, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were able to come to a deal to deescalate and reduce their arms. 

Photo by Markian Dobczansky

Overall, Colbourn argues that the deployment of Euromissiles created not just one crisis for NATO, but a series of crises. The Euromissiles crises raised anew questioned about the usefulness of NATO and fanned doubts over U.S. commitment to Europe and West Germany’s influence in Europe. Ultimately, Colbourn finds problem with the narrative that what was required at the time was a need to escalate to deescalate. She warns that this old narrative is not necessarily reflective of the reality of the time and that the “escalate to deescalate” policy may not be repeatable in different circumstances. Colbourn stresses the importance of nuance and complexity, emphasizing that historical narratives are a constellation of decisions, big and small, rather a single, perfect narrative.