Quo Vadis Wilders? Understanding the Failure (and Success) of Populism in Dutch Politics

 

by Eylül Begüm Sağlam, PhD student in Political Science and a 2023-24 Research Assistant at the European Union Center

On November 22, 2023, the Dutch electorate went to the polls to decide who will represent them for the next four years. The outcome of the general elections was surprising for many, with the right-wing populist Party for Freedom (PVV) winning 37 seats in the House of Representatives, more than any other party. Nevertheless, this victory on the part of PVV did not necessarily strengthen the hand of its leader Geert Wilders, who must now form a coalition in order to hold a majority in the 150-seat chamber.[1] In early March, Wilders admitted that he would not be able to serve as the prime minister since his candidacy was not backed by other possible coalition partners after months-long discussions.[2] This announcement was followed by former senator Kim Putters’ statement on how an “extra-parliamentary” government would be formed between four right-wing parties: PVV, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Farmer–Citizen Movement (BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC).[3] The coming days will show how coalition agreements will be finalized between the parties, but an analysis of Wilders’ past, present, and future projects a rise of right wing populism in Europe.

1. Past: Wilders’ VVD Days

The Netherlands’ current wave of populism — albeit in a “moderate”[4] form — can arguably be dated back to 2002 with Pim Portuyn's formation of Pim Portuyn List (LPF), which received 17 percent of the votes in the 2002 general election despite having been established only a couple of months prior.[5] After LPF broke down following the assassination of Fortuyn, his “legacy was taken up by” Wilders.[6] Nevertheless, Wilders did not enter the political scene with PVV. In fact, his early days as a politician looked quite different from how he portrays himself today. As a VVD member of the parliament, Wilders was in favor of several proposals which he later castigated: adoption of the euro, extension of EU membership to Eastern European countries, and negotiations on Türkiye’s membership.[7] In the first election after its foundation, in 2006, PVV received nine seats in the House of Representatives and backed the minority government via a support agreement (gedoogakkoord) formed by VVD in 2010.[8] Although PVV's rise was alarming, it was not surprising.

2. Today: Wilders Taking the Lead?

How should the current support for PVV be explained? PVV’s upset in the 2023 elections should not be understood simply through the lens of the recent campaign dynamics. Rather, the support for PVV says more about the electorate's long-running dissatisfaction with Dutch politics than their affinity with the PVV per se. Reflecting on the 2017 general elections, De Vries (2018, 1542-1545) argues that three factors can help us understand the political behavior of voters in the Netherlands and the increasing support for right-wing populism within the context of PVV: party fragmentation, the fading salience of mainstream politics as well as parties, and economic insecurity.[9] First, 15 parties were elected into the House of Representatives in 2023, which has only 150 seats, indicating the existence of party fragmentation. Second, as De Vries (2018, 1544-1545) noted after the 2017 elections, the inclusion of various small and new parties (e.g., DENK and New Social Contract) in the House of Representatives vis-à-vis major parties highlights the shift in the Dutch electorate's preferences from right-left ideology to theme-based parties (e.g., liberal values, immigration, EU skepticism, animal rights).[10] And third, anti-immigration sentiment and EU skepticism among the Dutch derive from concerns about the economy.[11] This also explains why not only PVV”s anti-immigration rhetoric but also proposals to leave the EU (“Nexit” referendum)[12] may receive support from a wider audience.

3. Future: Will Wilders be “Milders”[13]?

Wilders may have stepped back from forming the government for the time being, but it should be noted that the Netherlands is known as a country where coalition dialogues between parties may take months, even almost a year, considering how the previous coalition took 299 days to form.[14] Regardless of whether Wilders comes forth again or steps back as he recently did, both he and his party would need to do more than coming in first in the elections if the goal is to consolidate power and maintain their political popularity for future elections. One strategy that Wilders may employ is to de-radicalize both his rhetoric and policy proposals. Wilders has already shown signs of transforming into a milder version of his political self as he laid stress on becoming “prime minister for all Dutch people” two weeks before the elections took place.[15] More tangible strategies toward such a goal for Wilders may include rolling back his anti-EU rhetoric, stepping back from radical anti-Islamic proposals, and following a more center-right leaning political profile.[16] Even if Wilders may need to put aside his dreams of becoming the prime minister of the Netherlands, the recent elections could still be portrayed as a success story for the radical right-wing populism in the country: a party which once could only push for limited illiberal actions by supporting a liberal minority coalition, may be now at the mainstream center to make these illiberal policies finally come to fruition.[17]

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[1] Homel, Lisa. “The shocking Dutch election is done. The political maneuvering is just beginning.” New Atlanticist (Atlantic Council), December 4, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-shocking-dutch-election-is-done-the-political-maneuvering-is-just-beginning/.

[2] Henley, Jon. “Geert Wilders gives up hope of being Dutch PM due to lack of support.” The Guardian, March 13, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/13/geert-wilders-gives-up-hope-of-being-dutch-pm-due-to-lack-of-support.

[3] Henley, Jon. “Formation of Dutch government advances as far-right Wilders admits he can’t be PM.” The Guardian, March 14, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/14/formation-dutch-government-advances-far-right-wilders-admits-cant-be-pm.

[4] Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. “Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe.” Party Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 195. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514.

[5] Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. “Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe.” Party Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 196. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514; Pauwels, Teun. Populism in Western Europe : Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 45-46.

[6] Pauwels, Teun. Populism in Western Europe : Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 44.

[7] Vossen, Koen. The Power of Populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 27.

[8] Brand, Constant. “Dutch parties agree to form coalition government.” Politico, September 29, 2010. https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-parties-agree-to-form-coalition-government/; de Lange, Sarah L. “New alliances: why mainstream parties govern with radical right wing populist parties.” In The Populist Radical Right: A Reader edited by Cas Mudde. New York: Routledge, 2017, 604.

[9] De Vries, Catherine. “The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 11 (2018): 1542-1545.  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2017.1339730.

[10]  De Vries, Catherine. “The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 11 (2018): 1544-1545.  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2017.1339730; Poll of  Polls “Netherlands — 2023 general election.” Politico. Accessed May 1, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/netherlands/.

[11]De Vries, Catherine. “The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 11 (2018): 1555 and 1558.   https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2017.1339730.

[12] Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[13] Corder, Mike, and Raf Casert. “In a shock for Europe, anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders records a massive win in Dutch elections.” AP News, November 23, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/netherlands-election-candidates-prime-minister-f31f57a856f006ff0f2fc4984acaca6b.

[14] Henley, Jon. “Task of forming majority government in Netherlands just got a lot harder.” The Guardian, February 8, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/08/task-of-forming-majority-government-in-netherlands-just-got-a-lot-harder.

[15] Corder, Mike, and Raf Casert. “In a shock for Europe, anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders records a massive win in Dutch elections.” AP News, November 23, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/netherlands-election-candidates-prime-minister-f31f57a856f006ff0f2fc4984acaca6b; Gigova, Radina, and Xiaofei Xu. “Dutch far-right populist seeks to form government after shock election victory.” CNN, November 23, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/22/europe/netherlands-election-intl/index.html; Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[16] Matthijs, Matthias. “What Do the Dutch Elections Mean for Europe?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-do-dutch-elections-mean-europe; Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[17] Pappas, Takis S. Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 74.; Schaart, Eline. “After Geert Wilders gives up, what’s next for the Netherlands?” Politico, March 14, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/with-geert-wilders-give-up-what-is-next-netherlands/ 

 

Quo Vadis Wilders? Understanding the Failure (and Success) of Populism in Dutch Politics

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Personality Matters: A Recap of Sibel Oktay’s Politics Workshop

by Kelsi Quick, PhD Student in Political Science and a Research Assistant at the European Union Center

The European Union Center recently co-sponsored with the Political Science Department a guest speaker, Dr. Sibel Oktay, for the Political Science Department’s ongoing speaker series, the “Politics Workshop.” Oktay, Associate Professor at the University of Illinois Springfield and current Jefferson Fellow at the United States State Department, gave a talk about her recently published paper, “Crisis Leadership in the Time of Covid: Effects of Personality Traits on Response Speed.” In her talk, Oktay discussed the effect of different personality traits on how quickly leaders responded to the outbreak of Covid in their respective countries. The results of her research demonstrate that personality traits do have a significant impact on how and why leaders chose to respond when they do, leaving us with many real-world implications.

Oktay builds a foundation for her argument by first explaining that people behave differently in the context of a crisis, and that personality is a major driver of this. Personality traits, furthermore, help shape and determine perceptions of a threat and how one should respond. Since crises by definition lack a common frame of reference for leaders to turn to, personality traits surge forth and fulfill the task of providing direction. Extant literature has traditionally talked about leadership personality traits in terms of charisma, pragmatism, proactiveness, and the effect of gender. Oktay, however, pushes back against these traditional models and advocates for a methodology known as Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), which allows for researcher to analyze how leaders speak and relate to the world with the added benefit of the method being quantifiable and replicable. The main traits under consideration include a leader’s attitude toward their power position, a leader’s approach to gathering information and problem solving, and the leader’s approach to the world around them. Oktay argues that these traits, taken collectively, then shape a leader’s response speed to the Covid crisis.

By applying this LTA method to leaders from 32 European countries and focusing on seven main leadership traits, Oktay analyzes how these factors interact with the time (in days) it took for leaders to implement their first required mitigation response (i.e. lockdowns, social distancing). She ultimately concludes that leaders with higher degrees of self-confidence (defined here as something close to arrogance, stubbornness) and a tendency to challenge constraints are likely to have a slower response to implementing mitigation procedures. In contrast, leaders who score higher on the ‘openness’ trait are more likely to responder quicker in a crisis such as Covid. This leaves us with a few things to reflect on: 1) individual leaders were game-changers in the early stages of Covid response, and their responses mattered 2) this research suggests that leaders who have more openness are better suited for handling crises such as Covid and 3) who we elect to be our leaders, and the personality traits of those leaders, matter.

Personality Matters: A Recap of Sibel Oktay’s Politics Workshop

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14th Illinois EU Studies Conference Panel Recap: “Race and Racism in TV Series, Hollywood Movies and Films"

by Kelsi Quick, PhD Student in Political Science and Research Assistant at the European Union Center

The 14th Illinois EU Studies Conference, "Paradigms of Racialization: Alternative Sources," continued on April 19 for its second day of presentations. The first panel of the day, “Race and Racism in TV Series, Hollywood Movies and Films,” focused on the ways in which conceptions of race and ethnicity shape and are shaped by entertainment media, especially through Hollywood production.

Robin Williams as Vladimir Ivanoff in "Moscow on the Hudson" 

Flavia Ciontu, a PhD student in American studies at University of Paris 8, presented research by the title “‘You are white ... even if you are Russian': Whiteness and Immigration in Moscow on the Hudson (1984).” Her research, which analyzes the 1984 film "Moscow on the Hudson" starring Robin Williams, explores how a Russian saxophonist and immigrant to the United States experiences integration and assimilation, paying particular attention to what extent the main character’s experience of cultural and ethnic difference does and does not represent the experience of immigration to the United States. She highlights how although the protagonist, Vladimir, experiences challenges to integration, he still benefits from his status as a white male, which differs from the experience of immigration held by people of color. Ciontu ultimately argues that the film is a celebration of American culture rather than ethnic particularity that promotes the racist myth of easy assimilation. She argues that critical engagement with films such as this allows for the unraveling of racial dynamics in discourses on race and prevalence of whiteness in discussions on assimilation.

Sébastien Lefait, a professor of English studies at Aix-Marseille Université, presented research by the title “Introducing New Sources to Understand Hollywood’s Biased Treatment of Racism in the US.” In Lefait’s analysis of 134 films, which was co-authored with Olivier Esteves (University of Lille), both statistical and qualitative analysis is utilized to examine the ways in which Hollywood presents and reinforces a biased perspective on the history of racism in the United States. The results of the research indicate that of the films that depict studies of racism, the ones most likely to be critically-acclaimed, Oscar-winning films are also more likely to be films that are set in the Deep South and in time periods of over 50 years in the past. This trend, Lefait argues, reinforces the notion of “Southern exceptionalism” that tends to depict the South as uniquely racist while overlooking racism in the Northern and Western United States. Adding other sources such as educational materials from the case of France, Lefait further demonstrates how this myth of “Southern exceptionalism” extends outside of the U.S. and can be seen in France as well, and even at a global level. Ultimately, this trend of bias in Hollywood and also in other sources such as schoolbooks leads Lefait to conclude that a bias in the treatment of racism in the U.S. persists, largely appearing in the form of Southern exceptionalism, as a historical problem that has been “resolved,” and as an individual rather than systemic issue.

14th Illinois EU Studies Conference Panel Recap: “Race and Racism in TV Series, Hollywood Movies and Films"

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14th Illinois EU Studies Conference Panel Recap: "Alternative Sources from the Medieval and Early Modern Worlds"

(l-r): Heather Duncan, Mauro Nobili, Brian Sandberg, Cord J. Whitaker, Craig Koslofsky, Said Bousbina 

by Sydney Lazarus, outreach & FLAS coordinator at the European Union Center

Last Thursday, the EU Center’s 14th Illinois EU Studies Conference (“Paradigms of Racialization: Alternative Sources”) began with a panel of four presentations on primary sources that shed light on the question of race and racialization during the medieval and early modern periods. 

The first presenter, Brian Sandberg, a professor of history at Northern Illinois University, sought to historicize Islamophobia in France and the Mediterranean world by looking at practices of racism in the early modern period, specifically towards Moors and Turks. Written sources from 1550 to 1650 show that “Moors” and “Turks” were commonly used as interchangeable terms that were increasingly racialized (“rascals,” “barbarous dogs,” “infidels” of a “vile race”). Works of art from this period similarly depict the North African coast as a dangerous and violent source of piracy. Sandberg cited Aert Anthonisz’s 1615 painting “A French Ship and Barbary Pirates,” which shows a French ship under attack by galleys decorated with crescents, and the Monument of the Four Moors, executed in 1622-1626. The monument depicts Ferdinando I de’ Medici in military armor, standing above four chained men, whose likenesses, according to the art historian Mark Rosen, were taken from enslaved North Africans in Livorno. By considering these visual sources from Marseille and Livorno, Sandberg concluded, it is possible to get a sense of racialization and racism in the pre-modern period and see that racism far predates the scientific racism of the nineteenth century.

Monument of the Four Moors. Photo courtesy of Giovanni Dall'Orto (Wikicommons)

Said Bousbina, an independent researcher, and Mauro Nobili, an associate professor of history at University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, next gave a joint presentation focusing on a royal statement issued by Ahmad al-Mansur to inform the people of Fez of Morocco’s conquest of the bilad al-sudan (“the land of blacks”) at the end of the sixteenth century. Bousbina and Nobili argued that the text shows how Ahmad al-Mansur used race to justify his conquest of the Songhay Empire, a West African polity with a Muslim majority, to the ulama, who were skeptical of the legality of the invasion. The statement claims the superiority of Islam over other religions, of the Saadi dynasty over other dynasties, and of the Saadi over their enemies. References to blackness and darkness in contrast to clarity and light are omnipresent in the text, Bousbina and Nobili noted, citing as an example the following excerpt: “God allowed the white swords of our Saadian army to subdue our yellow enemies [sufriyya] and our black slaves [abid sudaniyya] and allowed the lights of our caliphate to pierce the black darkness [dujna sawda] that reigned in the south.”

In the third presentation, Cord J. Whitaker, an associate professor of English at Wellesley College, drew on “The King of Tars” and “Ywain and Gawain” in making the case for medieval romances as useful sources for critical race studies. “The King of Tars” tells the story of a pagan sultan of Damascus whose black skin turns white after he converts to Christianity. In “Ywain and Gawain,” Ywain, a Knight of the Round Table, is advised by his friend Gawain to leave the comfort of his home and wife in search of honor. Whitaker gave several reasons for why medieval romances deserve to be studied in the context of modern race studies. They are meant to produce strong emotional and affective responses, which can be used to reconstruct the worldview of their readers. Medieval romances also function as a way to discuss the indiscussible, revealing the cultural fantasies of medieval Europeans. Third, in both medieval romances and modern race studies, scholars can observe a dynamic negotiation between self and other. Lastly, Whitaker noted, studying medieval romances allows one to explore psychic pain that is similar to the modern experience of race.

The panel’s final presentation, “Whiteness from Below: Tattooed Servants, Soldiers, and Sailors in the British Atlantic World, c. 1680 to 1750,” was given by Craig Koslofsky, a professor of history at University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Koslofsky contextualized the various forms of tattooing within the broader set of early modern dermal marking practices and argued that the voluntary self-tattooing of indentured servants acted as an expression of the hope of self-ownership. The tattooing of one’s initials on one’s arm, wrist, or hand staked a claim to self-ownership and helped preserve one’s identity. When the tattoo included the servant’s birth year or the year of the start of the indenture, the marks also served a practical record-keeping purpose by allowing a servant to show proof that the term of indenture was to end in x number of years. This self-tattooing, Koslofsky posited, can be seen as a claim of whiteness from below, because it operated in direct contrast to the branding of enslaved Africans, typically with the initials of their owner, in which case the dermal mark signified perpetual servitude and status as chattel owned by another person.

Organized by Claire Bourhis Mariotti, Markian Dobczansky, Heather Duncan, Mauro Nobili, and Amanda Smith, this conference was part of a multi-year project aimed at testing the assumptions of Critical Race Theory within the multiracial and multicultural context of the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds, from the medieval period to contemporary times. Funding for the project came from the Albertine Foundation’s Transatlantic Research Partnership grant. Recordings of most of the presentations from the conference will be posted to the EU Center’s YouTube channel.

14th Illinois EU Studies Conference Panel Recap: "Alternative Sources from the Medieval and Early Modern Worlds"

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