A FLAS Fellow's Semester Abroad in Amman

Audrey Dombro, an agricultural and consumer economics student and 2019-20 FLAS fellow, reflects upon her experience studying in Jordan.

Master of Arts in European Union Studies

The European Union Center at the University of Illinois offers the only Master of Arts in European Union Studies (MAEUS) program in the Western Hemisphere. Learn more here.

Nuclear Energy and Its Environmental, Policy, and Security Implications

On Earth Day 2022, the EU Center organized a symposium on the future of technology, energy, and security in Europe, featuring prominent scholars and policy makers from France, Germany, and the U.S.

Conversations on Europe

Watch the collection of online roundtable discussions on different EU issues sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh.

Accelerating Climate Change Mitigation: Policy Statements on the Road to Sharm-El-Sheikh and Beyond

Bruce Murray, Resident Director of the Illinois Program in Vienna, presents a series of student-written policy statements for accelerating climate change mitigation.

Videos of Previous Lectures

Missed an EUC-hosted lecture? Our blog's video tag has archived previous EUC-sponsored lectures.

Friday, May 17, 2024

EU Center to Sponsor Three Midwest Educators on Study Tour of Brussels and Luxembourg

Photo by Markian Dobczansky
by Sydney Lazarus, outreach & FLAS coordinator at the European Union Center

This June 16-22, the European Union Center will be sponsoring three K-14 educators on the Brussels-Lux Study Tour, a week-long study tour to Belgium and Luxembourg intended to provide educators with first-hand knowledge of the European Union and its institutions. Funded by the U.S. Department of Education’s Title VI National Resource Center grant, the study tour is organized by the University of Pittsburgh’s European Studies Center in cooperation with the University of North Carolina’s Center for European Studies.

Our EU Center has been sponsoring educators and students to go on this study tour for over a decade. Participants spend five days in Brussels visiting EU institutions, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European External Action Service. Since 2022, the study tour has also included a day trip to Luxembourg to visit the Court of Justice of the European Union. The guided tours of EU institutions are balanced with visits to NATO, museums, and, of course, free time to explore Brussels. After the tour, the participants design lesson plans and syllabi incorporating what they learned during the week.

2023 Brussels-Lux Study Tour participants at NATO Headquarters. Photo by Markian Dobczansky
The three educators sponsored by the EU Center this year are Paul Edleman, a political science and communication studies instructor at Sauk Valley Community College in Rock Falls, Ill.; Dan Hoppe, a world history and comparative government teacher at Bay Port High School in Green Bay, Wisc; and Anne Oestreicher, a legal studies instructor at Northeast Wisconsin Technical College in Green Bay, Wisc. These three educators were selected from a pool of 45 applications. The EU Center's funding to support
these three educators also comes from the U.S. Department of Education's Title VI National Resource Center grant.

The itinerary for the 2024 study tour will be finalized in the coming days. Check back later this summer for photos and impressions from the study tour!

Adolphe Bridge in Luxembourg City. Photo by Markian Dobczansky

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Monday, May 6, 2024

Quo Vadis Wilders? Understanding the Failure (and Success) of Populism in Dutch Politics

 

by Eylül Begüm Sağlam, PhD student in Political Science and a 2023-24 Research Assistant at the European Union Center

On November 22, 2023, the Dutch electorate went to the polls to decide who will represent them for the next four years. The outcome of the general elections was surprising for many, with the right-wing populist Party for Freedom (PVV) winning 37 seats in the House of Representatives, more than any other party. Nevertheless, this victory on the part of PVV did not necessarily strengthen the hand of its leader Geert Wilders, who must now form a coalition in order to hold a majority in the 150-seat chamber.[1] In early March, Wilders admitted that he would not be able to serve as the prime minister since his candidacy was not backed by other possible coalition partners after months-long discussions.[2] This announcement was followed by former senator Kim Putters’ statement on how an “extra-parliamentary” government would be formed between four right-wing parties: PVV, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Farmer–Citizen Movement (BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC).[3] The coming days will show how coalition agreements will be finalized between the parties, but an analysis of Wilders’ past, present, and future projects a rise of right wing populism in Europe.

1. Past: Wilders’ VVD Days

The Netherlands’ current wave of populism — albeit in a “moderate”[4] form — can arguably be dated back to 2002 with Pim Portuyn's formation of Pim Portuyn List (LPF), which received 17 percent of the votes in the 2002 general election despite having been established only a couple of months prior.[5] After LPF broke down following the assassination of Fortuyn, his “legacy was taken up by” Wilders.[6] Nevertheless, Wilders did not enter the political scene with PVV. In fact, his early days as a politician looked quite different from how he portrays himself today. As a VVD member of the parliament, Wilders was in favor of several proposals which he later castigated: adoption of the euro, extension of EU membership to Eastern European countries, and negotiations on Türkiye’s membership.[7] In the first election after its foundation, in 2006, PVV received nine seats in the House of Representatives and backed the minority government via a support agreement (gedoogakkoord) formed by VVD in 2010.[8] Although PVV's rise was alarming, it was not surprising.

2. Today: Wilders Taking the Lead?

How should the current support for PVV be explained? PVV’s upset in the 2023 elections should not be understood simply through the lens of the recent campaign dynamics. Rather, the support for PVV says more about the electorate's long-running dissatisfaction with Dutch politics than their affinity with the PVV per se. Reflecting on the 2017 general elections, De Vries (2018, 1542-1545) argues that three factors can help us understand the political behavior of voters in the Netherlands and the increasing support for right-wing populism within the context of PVV: party fragmentation, the fading salience of mainstream politics as well as parties, and economic insecurity.[9] First, 15 parties were elected into the House of Representatives in 2023, which has only 150 seats, indicating the existence of party fragmentation. Second, as De Vries (2018, 1544-1545) noted after the 2017 elections, the inclusion of various small and new parties (e.g., DENK and New Social Contract) in the House of Representatives vis-à-vis major parties highlights the shift in the Dutch electorate's preferences from right-left ideology to theme-based parties (e.g., liberal values, immigration, EU skepticism, animal rights).[10] And third, anti-immigration sentiment and EU skepticism among the Dutch derive from concerns about the economy.[11] This also explains why not only PVV”s anti-immigration rhetoric but also proposals to leave the EU (“Nexit” referendum)[12] may receive support from a wider audience.

3. Future: Will Wilders be “Milders”[13]?

Wilders may have stepped back from forming the government for the time being, but it should be noted that the Netherlands is known as a country where coalition dialogues between parties may take months, even almost a year, considering how the previous coalition took 299 days to form.[14] Regardless of whether Wilders comes forth again or steps back as he recently did, both he and his party would need to do more than coming in first in the elections if the goal is to consolidate power and maintain their political popularity for future elections. One strategy that Wilders may employ is to de-radicalize both his rhetoric and policy proposals. Wilders has already shown signs of transforming into a milder version of his political self as he laid stress on becoming “prime minister for all Dutch people” two weeks before the elections took place.[15] More tangible strategies toward such a goal for Wilders may include rolling back his anti-EU rhetoric, stepping back from radical anti-Islamic proposals, and following a more center-right leaning political profile.[16] Even if Wilders may need to put aside his dreams of becoming the prime minister of the Netherlands, the recent elections could still be portrayed as a success story for the radical right-wing populism in the country: a party which once could only push for limited illiberal actions by supporting a liberal minority coalition, may be now at the mainstream center to make these illiberal policies finally come to fruition.[17]


[1] Homel, Lisa. “The shocking Dutch election is done. The political maneuvering is just beginning.” New Atlanticist (Atlantic Council), December 4, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-shocking-dutch-election-is-done-the-political-maneuvering-is-just-beginning/.

[2] Henley, Jon. “Geert Wilders gives up hope of being Dutch PM due to lack of support.” The Guardian, March 13, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/13/geert-wilders-gives-up-hope-of-being-dutch-pm-due-to-lack-of-support.

[3] Henley, Jon. “Formation of Dutch government advances as far-right Wilders admits he can’t be PM.” The Guardian, March 14, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/14/formation-dutch-government-advances-far-right-wilders-admits-cant-be-pm.

[5] Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. “Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe.” Party Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 196. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514; Pauwels, Teun. Populism in Western Europe : Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 45-46.

[6] Pauwels, Teun. Populism in Western Europe : Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 44.

[7] Vossen, Koen. The Power of Populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. London and New York: Routledge, 2017, 27.

[8] Brand, Constant. “Dutch parties agree to form coalition government.” Politico, September 29, 2010. https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-parties-agree-to-form-coalition-government/; de Lange, Sarah L. “New alliances: why mainstream parties govern with radical right wing populist parties.” In The Populist Radical Right: A Reader edited by Cas Mudde. New York: Routledge, 2017, 604.

[10]  De Vries, Catherine. “The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 11 (2018): 1544-1545.  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2017.1339730; Poll of  Polls “Netherlands — 2023 general election.” Politico. Accessed May 1, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/netherlands/.

[11]De Vries, Catherine. “The cosmopolitan-parochial divide: changing patterns of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands and beyond.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 11 (2018): 1555 and 1558.   https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2017.1339730.

[12] Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[13] Corder, Mike, and Raf Casert. “In a shock for Europe, anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders records a massive win in Dutch elections.” AP News, November 23, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/netherlands-election-candidates-prime-minister-f31f57a856f006ff0f2fc4984acaca6b.

[14] Henley, Jon. “Task of forming majority government in Netherlands just got a lot harder.” The Guardian, February 8, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/08/task-of-forming-majority-government-in-netherlands-just-got-a-lot-harder.

[15] Corder, Mike, and Raf Casert. “In a shock for Europe, anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders records a massive win in Dutch elections.” AP News, November 23, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/netherlands-election-candidates-prime-minister-f31f57a856f006ff0f2fc4984acaca6b; Gigova, Radina, and Xiaofei Xu. “Dutch far-right populist seeks to form government after shock election victory.” CNN, November 23, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/22/europe/netherlands-election-intl/index.html; Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[16] Matthijs, Matthias. “What Do the Dutch Elections Mean for Europe?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-do-dutch-elections-mean-europe; Kirby, Paul, and Anna Holligan. “Dutch election: Anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders wins dramatic victory.” BBC, November 23, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67504272.

[17] Pappas, Takis S. Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 74.; Schaart, Eline. “After Geert Wilders gives up, what’s next for the Netherlands?” Politico, March 14, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/with-geert-wilders-give-up-what-is-next-netherlands/ 

 


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Friday, May 3, 2024

Personality Matters: A Recap of Sibel Oktay’s Politics Workshop

by Kelsi Quick, PhD Student in Political Science and a Research Assistant at the European Union Center

The European Union Center recently co-sponsored with the Political Science Department a guest speaker, Dr. Sibel Oktay, for the Political Science Department’s ongoing speaker series, the “Politics Workshop.” Oktay, Associate Professor at the University of Illinois Springfield and current Jefferson Fellow at the United States State Department, gave a talk about her recently published paper, “Crisis Leadership in the Time of Covid: Effects of Personality Traits on Response Speed.” In her talk, Oktay discussed the effect of different personality traits on how quickly leaders responded to the outbreak of Covid in their respective countries. The results of her research demonstrate that personality traits do have a significant impact on how and why leaders chose to respond when they do, leaving us with many real-world implications.

Oktay builds a foundation for her argument by first explaining that people behave differently in the context of a crisis, and that personality is a major driver of this. Personality traits, furthermore, help shape and determine perceptions of a threat and how one should respond. Since crises by definition lack a common frame of reference for leaders to turn to, personality traits surge forth and fulfill the task of providing direction. Extant literature has traditionally talked about leadership personality traits in terms of charisma, pragmatism, proactiveness, and the effect of gender. Oktay, however, pushes back against these traditional models and advocates for a methodology known as Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), which allows for researcher to analyze how leaders speak and relate to the world with the added benefit of the method being quantifiable and replicable. The main traits under consideration include a leader’s attitude toward their power position, a leader’s approach to gathering information and problem solving, and the leader’s approach to the world around them. Oktay argues that these traits, taken collectively, then shape a leader’s response speed to the Covid crisis.

By applying this LTA method to leaders from 32 European countries and focusing on seven main leadership traits, Oktay analyzes how these factors interact with the time (in days) it took for leaders to implement their first required mitigation response (i.e. lockdowns, social distancing). She ultimately concludes that leaders with higher degrees of self-confidence (defined here as something close to arrogance, stubbornness) and a tendency to challenge constraints are likely to have a slower response to implementing mitigation procedures. In contrast, leaders who score higher on the ‘openness’ trait are more likely to responder quicker in a crisis such as Covid. This leaves us with a few things to reflect on: 1) individual leaders were game-changers in the early stages of Covid response, and their responses mattered 2) this research suggests that leaders who have more openness are better suited for handling crises such as Covid and 3) who we elect to be our leaders, and the personality traits of those leaders, matter.
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